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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Tricia Franklin appeals from her judgment of conviction for felony DUI.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On February 6, 2013, at about 10:12 p.m., Boise County Deputy Tatalian
received a call from dispatch to respond to an accident scene in Boise County on
the Banks-Lowman highway. (R., p. 79.) He was at that time off duty and at his
home in Boise, Ada County, and he did not arrive at the accident scene until
about 10:47. (Id.) Fire department personnel informed him that they had treated
an injured female, the only person they had found at the scene, and that she had
been transported to a hospital in Boise. (R., p. 80.)
Deputy Tatalian had encountered the truck involved in the accident earlier
that evening in relation to a report of an intoxicated driver. (R., pp. 79-80.) He
found the vehicle, parked at the time at the Wander Inn in Crouch, and made
contact with Franklin and her boyfriend, Jason Snowball, at one of the rooms in
the inn. (R., p. 80.) Because they appeared to be intoxicated, he instructed
them to not drive again that evening. (Id.) Based on this earlier encounter,
Deputy Tatalian concluded that the female treated and then taken from the scene
was likely Franklin. (Id.) However, he also found Snowball’s wallet at the scene.
(Id.) Unsure who had been driving at the time of the accident and wanting to
confirm that Snowball was not in need of medical assistance, Deputy Tatalian
returned to the Wander Inn, where he was able to contact Snowball, who was
apparently asleep and not involved in the accident. (Id.)
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Deputy Tatalian contacted a phlebotomist in Boise and arranged for
another deputy to meet her at the hospital where Franklin had been taken. (R.,
pp. 80-81.) The phlebotomist and Deputy Rogers contacted Franklin, who was
“uncooperative and objected to the blood draw.” (R., p. 81.) The phlebotomist
handed sample tubes from the DUI kit to a nurse who was already drawing blood
for medical purposes; the nurse filled the tubes and handed the tubes to the
phlebotomist, who in turn handed the tubes to Deputy Rogers. (Id.) The blood
test resulted in a blood alcohol content measurement of 0.236 percent. (State’s
Exhibit 1.)
The state charged Franklin with felony DUI and driving without privileges.
(R., pp. 19-21.) Franklin filed a motion to suppress, among other things, the
results of the blood tests.

(R., pp. 25-27.)

The district court resolved one

contested fact by finding that Deputy Tatalian contacted Deputy Rogers and
arranged for the blood draw “at about 12:20 a.m. to 12:30 a.m. in the early
morning hours of February 7, 2013.” (R., pp. 80-81.)
Based on its factual findings, the district court denied the motion to
suppress on two grounds. First, the court determined that the blood draw was
justified by implied consent. (R., pp. 81-85.) Second, the court found the search
justified by exigent circumstances. (R., pp. 85-87.)
Franklin entered a conditional guilty plea to felony DUI, preserving her
right to appeal the denial of her suppression motion, and the state dismissed the
driving without privileges charge.

(R., p. 120.)

The district court entered

judgment and Franklin filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 130, 137.)
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ISSUE
Franklin states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Franklin’s motion to
suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Franklin failed to show error in the denial of her motion to suppress
where she failed to show any search occurred under the Fourth Amendment and
where exigent circumstances justified a warrantless blood draw?
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ARGUMENT
Franklin Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Her Motion To Suppress
Where She Failed To Show Any Search Occurred Under The Fourth Amendment
And Where Exigent Circumstances Justified A Warrantless Blood Draw
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Franklin’s suppression motion, finding that the

blood draw was justified under implied consent and exigent circumstances. (R.,
pp. 78-88.)

The state concedes that recent Idaho Supreme Court decisions

holding that implied consent may be revoked renders the implied consent
exception inapplicable under the facts of this case. Franklin has, however, failed
to show error in the district court’s exigent circumstances analysis. Moreover,
the district court’s order denying the motion to suppress may also be affirmed on
the basis that Franklin failed to prove that a search protected by the Fourth
Amendment occurred when a nurse already drawing blood for medical purposes
merely filled additional sample tubes for law enforcement use.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” State v. Colvin,
157 Idaho 881, 882, 341 P.3d 598, 599 (Ct. App. 2014).
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C.

Franklin Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Determination
That Exigent Circumstances Justified A Warrantless Blood Draw
“[W]arrants are generally required to search a person’s home or his

person unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law
enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978).
Such exigencies include the “imminent risk of destruction of evidence.” State v.
Robinson, 144 Idaho 496, 499, 163 P.3d 1208, 1211 (Ct. App. 2007).

“To

determine whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified
acting without a warrant, this Court looks to the totality of circumstances.”
Missouri v. McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1559 (2013). In Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768-69 (1966), the Supreme Court of the United
States found the following totality of the circumstances to justify a warrantless
blood draw because of exigent circumstances:
Here, there was plainly probable cause for the officer to arrest
petitioner and charge him with driving an automobile while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor. The police officer who arrived at
the scene shortly after the accident smelled liquor on petitioner’s
breath, and testified that petitioner’s eyes were ‘bloodshot, watery,
sort of a glassy appearance.’ The officer saw petitioner again at the
hospital, within two hours of the accident. There he noticed similar
symptoms of drunkenness. He thereupon informed petitioner ‘that
he was under arrest and that he was entitled to the services of an
attorney, and that he could remain silent, and that anything that he
told me would be used against him in evidence.’
(Footnote omitted.)
The accident in this case occurred before 10:12 p.m. (R., p. 79.) Deputy
Tatalian, who was off duty and at home in Boise at the time, received the call
from dispatch regarding the accident at about 10:12 p.m. (R., p. 79.) He arrived
5

at the scene at about 10:47 p.m. (R., p. 79.) Franklin had been transported from
the scene before Deputy Tatalian arrived.

(R., pp. 79-80.)

Deputy Tatalian

investigated who the driver of the vehicle had been, confirmed that Mr. Snowball
was not involved, and then, at about 12:20 or 12:30 a.m. contacted, through
dispatch, another deputy to conduct a blood draw on Franklin in Boise. (R., pp.
80-81.) The blood draw was accomplished at about 12:40 a.m. (R., p. 81.)
The district court considered the totality of the circumstances and
concluded that Deputy Tatalian did not complete his investigation until almost two
hours after the accident. (R., p. 86.) Seeking a warrant would have created a
“total delay of at least two (2) to three (3) hours.” (R., p. 86.) Because of the
metabolism of alcohol, “the additional time it would have taken to obtain a
warrant would likely have resulted in such a delay as to potentially deprive the
state of important evidence of alcohol concentration.”

(R., pp. 86-87.)

The

district court correctly applied the law to the facts and concluded it was
reasonable to proceed without seeking a search warrant under the totality of the
circumstances.
Franklin argues the district court’s factual finding that Deputy Tatalian
requested the blood draw at about midnight was clearly erroneous. (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 16-17.) This argument fails for several reasons. First, Franklin’s claim
the finding does not rely on “competent” evidence (Appellant’s brief, p. 16) is
fatuous because the district court relied on the testimony presented at a hearing.
Second, her claim that the factual findings “entirely disregard the testimony of
Ms. Schaadt” (Appellant’s brief, p. 16) is directly contrary to the record (R., p. 81
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(specifically summarizing the testimony of Ms. Schaadt, explaining that there was
“some inconsistency in evidence,” and resolving that inconsistency).) Third, her
reliance on “the dispatch records” (Appellant’s brief, p. 16) is mystifying because
although there were some questions based on dispatch records1 no such records
were admitted into evidence (see State’s Exhibit 1, Defense Exhibit A). The
record shows that the district court’s finding that Deputy Tatalian requested the
blood draw after midnight was based on its resolution of “some inconsistency in
the evidence” (R., p. 81), a matter within its province. Franklin has failed to show
clear error in the court’s factual finding.
Perhaps most importantly, however, Franklin has failed to articulate how a
finding of fact that Deputy Tatalian first contacted dispatch about securing a

Franklin claims the following: “[A]ccording to the dispatch log, Deputy Tatalian
contacted dispatch, by way of radio at 11:17 p.m. ‘to seek a phlebotomist and
officer to accomplish a blood draw’ on Ms. Franklin. (12/26/13 Tr., p.14, L.22 –
p.15, p. [sic] 7.)” (Appellant’s brief, p. 16.) This is not an accurate summation of
the evidence. The cited portion of the transcript, read verbatim, is as follows:
1

Q At some point did you, by way of radio, contact your
dispatch in Boise County to seek a phlebotomist and officer to
accomplish a blood draw?
A I did.
Q Do you recall what time that was?
A I don’t recall a specific time off the top of my head, no.
Q If the dispatch log indicates 11:17, would that be
accurate?
A It would be within a minute or two of me calling, yes.
(12/26/13 Tr., p. 14, L. 22 – p. 15, L. 7.) The testimony was that the dispatch
logs would, within a minute or two, accurately reflect when Deputy Tatalian
called. (12/26/13 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 4-7.) Thus, the time of the call would be 11:17
only “[i]f the dispatch log [so] indicates.” (12/26/13 Tr., p. 15, L. 4.) The dispatch
logs were never admitted into evidence. (See Exhibits.) Therefore, the evidence
does not require a factual finding that the logs did establish a call at 11:17 as
asserted by Franklin.
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phlebotomist and another officer to conduct a blood draw would have changed
the outcome of the exigent circumstances analysis. He merely assumes that
Deputy Tatalian’s initial contact with dispatch to arrange for a phlebotomist and
other officer to conduct a blood draw meant he “had decided that he could arrest
Ms. Franklin for DUI and [therefore] had ample time and ability to seek a
warrant.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 19.) It is actually Franklin’s assumption that lacks
an evidentiary basis.

Even if this Court were to conclude that dispatch was

initially contacted at 11:15 regarding getting a blood draw, there is no basis to
conclude that such contact came after, as opposed to during, Deputy Tatalian’s
investigation.
The relevant inquiry is not when Deputy Tatalian started making
arrangements for the blood draw but whether seeking a warrant after he had
conducted his investigation and obtained probable cause would have resulted in
a loss of evidence. The district court did not even mention in its analysis of
exigent circumstances when Deputy Tatalian first contacted dispatch about
arranging the blood draw, but instead relied heavily on the finding that Deputy
Tatalian completed his investigation by confirming that Snowball was not the
driver (and not involved in the accident) at around midnight. (R., pp. 85-87.)
Franklin has cited no evidence (other than conflicting evidence suggesting he
first requested dispatch to secure a phlebotomist and an officer to conduct a
blood test) that Deputy Tatalian had finished his investigation by 11:15 and was
therefore merely wasting his time for the next 45 minutes or so.

Because

Franklin is merely requesting this Court to make unwarranted leaps of logic from
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his claim of a clearly erroneous factual finding, Franklin has failed to show error
even if the factual finding about when Deputy Tatalian first broached the subject
of securing a phlebotomist and another officer with dispatch was clearly
erroneous.
Franklin next argues that the district court clearly erred by finding: “that it
would have taken at least two to three hours to obtain a warrant for the blood
draw.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-18.) This argument relies on the district court’s
statement that “there are exigent circumstances where, as here, law enforcement
cannot obtain a blood sample in a DUI investigation for between two (2) and
three (3) hours after developing probable cause to secure a warrant.” (R., p. 87.)
In context it is clear that the court was not finding that the warrant process itself
was two to three hours long, but rather referring to obtaining the sample two to
three hours after the crash. Earlier in the same paragraph the court found that
the “total delay,” including the investigation and obtaining a search warrant,
would have been “at least two (2) to three (3) hours.” (R., p. 86.) The district
court’s analysis was plainly that adding more time to obtain a search warrant to
the nearly two hours that had already passed during the investigation would
merely create too great a risk of loss of evidence. (R., pp. 86-87; compare with
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-69 (two hour investigation central to exigency
determination). Franklin has failed to show error.
The district court concluded that exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless blood draw because the total time of the investigation plus obtaining
a search warrant would have been about two to three hours, creating a
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substantial risk of loss of evidence of Franklin’s true BAC percentage. (R., pp.
86-87.) Franklin’s argument that the investigation was in fact done in about an
hour is contrary to the district court’s factual findings and, ultimately, the evidence
presented. Franklin has therefore failed to show error in the district court’s denial
of the motion to suppress.
D.

Franklin Failed To Show That Police Obtained Her Blood By A Search
Under The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment does not apply “absent some action taken by

government agents that can properly be classified as a ‘search’ or a ‘seizure.’”
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1985); see also United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984) (Fourth Amendment only applies to
governmental action, not actions of those who are not government agents);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) (wife’s actions within
scope of Fourth Amendment only if she “acted as an ‘instrument’ or agent of the
state when she produced her husband’s belongings”); Georgia v. Randolph, 547
U.S. 103, 146 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Under this Court’s precedents,
only the action of an agent of the government can constitute a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment ….”). It is “firmly established” that the Fourth
Amendment is not violated by private searches. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512,
517, 887 P.2d 57, 62 (Ct. App. 1994).
The search and seizure in this case was the “intrusion[] into [Franklin’s]
body.” Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769; see also State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501,
503, 975 P.2d 789, 791 (1998). That intrusion was accomplished in this case by
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a hospital nurse for medical purposes. (R., p. 81.) The only state action in
obtaining the blood was to ask the nurse to obtain more blood than she otherwise
would have, which did not involve any additional intrusion into Franklin’s body.
Because there was no search or seizure under the facts of this case, the district
court should be affirmed on this basis. See McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,
700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999) (correct ruling will be affirmed on the correct legal
theory); State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997); see
also State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 864, 11 P.3d 481, 483 (2000).
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s
judgment.
DATED this 9th day of March, 2016.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of March, 2016, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

KKJ/dd

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen___________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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